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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

JERRY SINE

AND

DORA SINE,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No. 7386
MILDRED IONA HARPER, Administratrix of the Estate of Cathrine
Jensen, deceased,
Defendant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE

~CASE

This is an appeal from the Decree of Reformation
entered April 25, 1949, in the Third Judicial District .
Court in and for Salt Lake County, purporting to
reform a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the sale of
real estate from Cathrine Jensen, defendant's testator,
to the :plaintiffs Jerry and Dora· Sine.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs, Jerry Sine and Dora Sine, his wife,
on or about the 27th day of July, 1947, employed a
Real Estate Agent by the name of Dowell to see if he
could negotiate a deal for the purchase in their behalf
of some real estate consisting of a lot and duplex to use
in connection with thei~ auto court. Dowell determined
the owner to be Cathrine Jensen and after two or three
visits with her obtained her signature on an Earnest
M·oney Receipt and Agreement agreeing to sell the property located at 656-658 West North Temple Street, in Salt
Lake City, Utah, for $8,500.00 with $1,500.00 down and
payments of $75.00 per month for the first two years and
after two years payments to be reduced to $60.00. Subsequently Dowell obtained from Cathrine Jensen an abstract and took it to his office where under his instructions a Uniform Real Estate Contract was prep·ared,
dated the 31st day of July, 1949, including the above
terms, and describing the real estate as a tract 115 feet
in depth with a 49¥2 foot frontage on West North Tem·ple
Street. This contract was subsequently signed by all parties. Between this tract ·and that already owned by the
plaintiffs as part of their auto court is a tract of vacant
property 115 feet deep with a 25lf2 fo-ot frontage also
owned by the said Cathrine Jensen, which is the subject
of this controversy.
Plaintiffs claim that it was the intention of all
p~arties that the contract was for the purchase of the
25lf2 foot tract a.s well as for the 49lf2 foot tract, and
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that the description of only the 49¥2 foot tract got
into the contract by mistake. Plaintiffs notified Cathrine
Jensen of the alleged mistake and asked her for· a nevv
contract eoYering both tracts, vvhich she refused to
giYe, and plaintiffs brought this action against her for
reformation of the contract. Cathrine Jensen answered
plaintiffs' complaint denying that sh~ had ever intended
to sell anything other than the 49¥2 tract, that there
"~as no mistake on her part, and that the action was
barred by the statute of frauds, Section 33-5-3, Utah
Code . .\nnotated 1943. Before the case could be brought
to trial, Cathrine Jensen died, and Mildred Iona Harper
\Yho w·as appointed Executrix of her estate, was substituted as defendant in the action by Jerry and Dora
Sine.
To clarify the issues for the court, we set out
plaintiffs' complaint, together with defendant's answers
to the allegations therein and ·plaintiffs' reply:
CO~fPLAIN'T

AS ANSWERED

For their cause of action against the defendant
plaintiffs allege:
1. Plaintiffs and defendant are, and at all times
herein mentioned were, residents of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah. (Admitted by defendant.)
2. Plaintiffs are, and at all times herein mentioned
were, the owners of the following described tract of
land in Salt Lake County, Utah, to wit:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Commencing 75 feet East of the Southwest
corner of Lot 3, Block 61, Plat "C ", Salt Lake
City Survey, and running thence East 151 feet;
thence North 127 feet; thence East 104 feet;
thence North 58 feet; thence West 11 feet; thence
North 104 feet; thence East 11 feet; thence North
·41 feet; thence West 206 feet; thence South 12
feet; thence West 112 feet; thence South 191
feet; thence East 112 feet; thence South 12 feet;
thence West 49 feet; thence South 115 feet; to
the place of beginning; together with a right of
way over the following: Commencing 124- feet
East and 115 feet North of the Southwest corner
of said Lot 3 and running thence 124 feet; thence ·
North 215 feet; thenc~ East 124 feet; thence
South 12 feet; thence West 112 feet; thence
South 191 feet; thence East 112 ·feet; thence
South 12 feet to the place of beginning.
(Admitted ·by defendant.)
3. Defendant is, and at all times herein mentioned was, the owner of legal title to property adjoining the
p~roperty described in Paragraph 2 hereof, which property is more particularly descibed as follows, to wit:
Commencing at the Southwest corner of Lot
3, Block 61, Plat '' C' ', Salt Lake City Survey,
and running thence East 75 feet; thence North
115 feet to an alley; thence West along the South
side of said alley 75 feet; thence South 115 feet
to place of beginning; together with a right of
way over said alley, the same being 12 feet wide
and extending from Western Avenue to the West
end of said tract.
(Admitted by defendant.)
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4. On or about July 27, 1947, an agent of plaintiffs
acting in their behalf entered into an oral agreement
W'ith defendaD:t for the purchase of defendant's property described in Paragraph 3 at a price of $8,500.00;
that on July 29, 1947, the said oral agreement was
reduced to 'vriting in the form of an Earnest Money
Receipt and Agreement, copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit ''A'' and by this reference made a part
hereof. (Defendant admitted the execution of the
Earnest :Jioney Receipt and Agreement, but denied aU
other allegations.)
5. That it "\vas and is the understanding of
parties that Exhibit ''A'' covered the property of
fendant described in Paragraph 3 hereof and was
property adjoining the property of plaintiffs and
tlte West thereof. (Denied by defendant.)

the
dethe
on

6. That on or about August 9, 1947, plaintiffs
caused their attorneys to examine the abstract submitted
to plaintiffs by defendant and supposed by plaintiffs to
cover the property described in Paragraph 3 and on
or about said date plaintiffs caused their aforementioned
agent to prepare a Uniform Real Estate Contract covering said property, which contract was dated July 31,
1947, and executed on or about August 10, 1947, copy
of which is attached hereto as· Exhibit '' B '' and by
this reference made a part hereof; and that in executing
said agreement the plaintiffs relied on their attorneys
and their agent as aforesaid to safeguard plaintiffs in
the ,purchase of the said property and execute Exhibit
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"B" in the belief that the said contract covered the
property described in Paragraph 3 and adjoined plaintiffs' property. (Defendant admitted the execution of
the Uniform Real Estate Contract, but denied the other
allegations for lack of knowledge.)
7. That plaintiffs have information which they
believe and therefore allege as a fact that defendant jn
signing Exhibits ''A'' and '' B'' did so in the belief
and with the understanding that she was selling to
plaintiffs the property described in Paragraph 3 hereof
and that she later discovered the mistake that had been
made, which discovery was made on or about July
15, 1948. (Denied by defendant.)
8. That plaintiffs discovered the abovementioned
mistake on or about July 17, 1948, and forthwith requested defendant to correct said mistake by reformi!Tg
Exhibit "B" to conform to the intentions of the parties
with reference thereto and that defendant ·thereupon
refused and has since refused to rewrite said agreen1ent·
although demand therefor has been made upon her so
to do. (Denied by defendant.)
WHEREFORE, :plaintiffs pray judgment against
the defendant that the contract between the parties
dated July 27, 1947, be corrected and reformed to cover
that tract of land 75 feet by 115 feet together with right
of way over alley to the North which adjoins the property of plaintiffs in Block 61, Plat "C ", Salt Lake City
Survey, according to the intentions of the parties at
the t_ime said agreement was executed and that plaintiffs
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haYe their costs incurred herein and sneh other furtltPr
and different relief as the court 8hall find to be equitable .
. A.s a further ans,ver to plaintiffs' complaint, and as
an affir1uative defense thereto, defendant alleged a~
follo".. s:
1. Defendant acquired the property described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiffs' complaint by t"·o separate
con,eyanres at different times and from different
grantors, to-,vit:
Parcell

Commencing at the South,Yest corner of Lot
3, Block 61, Pia t ' ' C '', Salt Lake City Survey,
and running thence East 491/2 feet ; thence North
115 feet; to an alley; thence 'Vest along the South
side of said Alley 49¥2 feet; thence South 115
feet to the place of beginning.
acquired from Catherine H. Hardy by warranty deed
dated September 24, 1930.
Parcel2

Beginning at a point 49¥2 feet East from the
Southwest corner of Lot 3, Block 61, Plat "C ",
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East
25¥2 feet; thence North 115 feet; thence West
25% feet; thence South 115 feet, to the place of
beginning.
acquired from Pehr J. W. von Ehrenheim by warranty
deed dated May 2, 1939.

2. That on or about July 29, 1947, defendant
signed a written agreement prepared by her agent, in
the form of the Earnest Money Receipt attached to
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plaintiffs' complaint as Exhibit "A", for the sale to
plaintiffs of the said Parcel 1 as described above.
3. That on or about July 29, 1947, defendant delivered to plaintiffs an abstract, well knowing and
understanding that said abstract covered only said
Parcel 1.
4. That never at any time did defendant sell, con.
tract to sell, either orally or by writing, or intend to
sell Parcel 2 to plaintiffs.
5. That plaintiffs' action is barred _by the provisions of Section 33-5-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943.
'VHEREFORE, defendant prays that plaintiffs
take nothing by their complaint, and that defendants go
hence V{ith their costs, and ·for such other relief as to
the court shall seem fit and proper.
In their Reply to Defendant's Answer plaintiffs
denied the allegations of paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the
affir1native defense, and alleged with reference to sai'l
affirmative defense that if the defendant acted in the
manner alleged in paragraphs-3 and 4 of the affirmative
_defense she defrauded the plaintiffs knov\ring full well
that the plaintiffs bargained for, agreed to buy, intended
to buy, and thought they were acquiring the_ property
-adjoining that alreaqy owned by plaintiffs and lying
immediately west of said property of plain tiffs.
T:r:ial was had upon the issues raised by the above
pleadings at which Jerry and Dora Sine were permitted
to testify over the objection of the defendant's attornev,,
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that it 'Yas their intention to purchase the 25¥2 foot
piece as 'Yell a.s the 49~·~ foot piece, and that they
thought that the Uniforn1 Real Estate Contract finally
entered into contained a description that covered both
tracts, although they ad1nitted that they didn't read
the contract. :Jir. Do"'ell 'Yas also perinitted to testify
as to his instructions fron1 :Jir. Sine to the effect that
he 'Yas to purchase the property adjoining the Sine
property, "~hich '""as objected to by defendant's counsel.
The court further permitted Dow·ell to testify concerning negotiations and conversations with Cathrine J ensen, over objections of 9-efendant's counsel that he was
an incompetent witness under the "dead man's statute",
Section 104-49-2 (3), Utah Code Annotated 1943. Defendant's motion to strike all of the above testimony,
and her motion for nonsuit at the end of plaintiffs'
case were denied by the trial court. Defendant's witnesses, including herself, two other daughters of Cathrine Jensen, Mr. J. C. J~nsen, surviving husband of
Cathrine Jensen, and C. W. Biddinger, former husband
of Cathrine Jensen all testified to statements of Mrs.
Jensen before her death, both before and soon after· the
transaction in issue, to the effect that it was .her intention not to sell the 25¥2 foot piece,· but rather to erect
a small building on it either for residential or business
purposes.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
The trial court made the following Findings of
F~u·,t and Conclusions of Law in favor of the plaintiffs:
1. Cathrine Jensen, the original defendant, passed
a\\·ay on or about November 26, 1948, and the defendant
Mil<lr:ed lona Harper was duly appointed executrix of
t1H· estate of Cathrine Jensen, deceased, on January 5,
1949, and. was substituted as defendant in the abovePntitled action by order of the court dated February
9, 1949.
2. In February 1946 the plaintiffs became the
O\rners of a tract of land in Block 61, Plat "C ", Salt
Lake City Survey, on the north side of West North
Ten1ple between 5th West and 6th West, Salt Lakt~
City, Utah, being more particularly described as follows,
Commencing 75 feet East of the Southwest
corner of Lot 3, Block 61, Plat '' C '', Salt Lake
City Survev, and running thence East 151 feet;
the~ce X o~th 127 feet; thence East 104 feet;
thence North 58 feet; thence West 11 feet; thence
X orth 104 feet; thevce East 11 feet; thence North
41 feet; thence West 206 feet; thence South 12
feet; thence West 112 feet; thence South 191
feet; thence East 112 feet; thence South 12 feet;
thence \"\Test 49 feet; thence South 115 feet to the
pJace of beginning; together with a right of way
over the following: Commencing 124 feet East
and 115 feet North of the Southwest corner of
said Lot 3 and running thence West 124 feet;
thence North 215 feet; thence East 124 feet;
thence South 12 feet; thence West 112 feet;
thence South 191 feet; thence East 112 feet;
thence South 12 feet to the ,pJace of beginning.
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3. In the fall of 1946 the plaintiffs pnrehasPd an
additional tract of land in said tract, being 33 x 125
feet in dimension in a northerly and easterly di rf\etion
from a point 127 feet ~ orth and 12 feet East of th~
South"~est corner of Lot 3 in said block, thus coinpleting purchase by the plaintiffs of all of the property
shown in pink on Exhibit B in this cause.
4. ..._-\..t all tin1es herein mentioned Cathrine Jensen
and the defendant as executrix of the estate of Cathrine
Jensen, deceased, have held legal title to property adjoining· the property described in finding 2 hereof, which
property is more particularly described as follo,vs,
to-wit:
Commencing at the Southwest corner of Lot
3, Block 61, Plat '~' C' ', Salt Lake Survey, anq
running thence East 75 feet; thence North 115
feet to an alley; thence West along the South
side of said alley 75 feet; thence South 115 feet
to place of beginning; together with a right of
way over said alley, the same being 12 feet wide
and extending from Western Avenue to the
West end of said tract.
5. On or about July 27, 1947, plaintiffs instructed
their agent to purchase in their behalf the property
described in the next preceding paragraph from the
owner of said property and on or about said date the
said agent, acting in behalf of the plaintiffs, entered
into an oral agreement with Cathrine Jensen for the
purchase of said property at ,a price of $8,500.00 and
on July 29, 1947, .the said oral agreement was reduced
to writing in the form of an Earnest Money Receipt
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and Agreement, which is Exhibit A in this cause, and
was signed by the respective parties thereto.
6. It was and is the understanding of the plaintiffs that Exhibit C covered the p.roperty of defendant
described in finding 4 hereof and was the -property
adjoining the front portion of the property of plaintiff~
and lying immediately to the west thereof.
7. On or about July 31, 1947, and within a few
days thereafter, the plaintiffs and Cathrine Jensen,
deceased, entered into a real estate contract, copy of
which is Exhibit D in this cause.

8. In -executing Exhibit D, the plaintiffs relied on
their attorneys and their agent as aforesaid to safeguard plaintiffs in the purchase of said property and
executed the original of Exhibit D in the belief and
with the un~erstanding that said Exhibit D covered
the property described in finding 4 and ·adjoined plaintiffs' property as herein -described.
9. Cathrine Jensen executed Exhibit C and the
original of Exhibit D in the belief and with the understanding that she vvas selling to plaintiffs the property
described in finding 4 hereof and that she discovered
a mistake in the description contained in the original
of Exhibit D either in September or November 1947.
10. Plaintiffs discovered the above mentioned mistake on or about July 24, 1948, •and forth"\\rith requested
Cathrine Jensen to correct said mistake by reforming
the original of Exhibit D to conform to the intentions
of the parties with reference thereto and so as to de-
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scribe the property de~cribed in finding 4 hereof, which
Cathrine Jensen and later the executrix of her estate
refused to do.
11. In entering into the original of Exhibit D, the
plaintiffs bargained for all of the property described in
finding 4 and would not have entered into the s~aid contract had they knovvn that Exhibit D did not correctly
describe the said prop.erty.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact the court
makes the follo\ving
CO~CLUSIONS

OF LAW

1. At the time the original of Exhibit D was entered into the plaintiffs and Cathrine Jensen had bargained f<:>r and believed that the transaction ~and sale
covered the property adjoining property owned by the __
plaintiffs and being a piece with 75 feet frontage and
115 feet in depth.
2. The original of Exhibit D erroneously described the intention and- understanding of the parties
with reference to the description of the land, and plaintiff·s would not- have entered into the said contract or
have made the said purchase for the land actually described in the original of Exhibit D.
3. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment reforming the contract between the parties to_ cover the land
intended by the p·arties to be sold by Cathrine Jensen
to the plaintiffs on or about July 31, 1947.
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4. Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs in this
action against the estate of Cathrine Jensen or Catherine Jensen, deceased.
In its decree of reformation the trial court ordered
the defendant to execute and deliver to the plaintiffs
a new contract describing the 25¥2 foot piece as "rell
as the 49lj2 foot tract.
Defendant obtained an order from the Probat~
Court "\\Thich has jurisdiction over the estate of Cath. ·
rine Jensen, for authorization to appeal to the Supreme
Court from the decree of reformation and for authority
to file an undertaking for costs and to execute the
contract as ordered by the trial court and deliver it
to the clerk of said court as required by Section 10441-10, Utah Code Annotated 1943. Defendant now appeals to this court for a reversal of said lower court 'H
judgment.
Further facts and details of testimony as might
be helpful to the court will appear hereafter in ap~
pellant's argument.
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ST.A.TE~IE~T

OF ERRORS RELIED UPON FOR
RE,~ERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT

The court erred :
1. In overruling defendant's demurrer to plaintiffs' complaint for the reason that it did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and
that said cause of action \Yas barred by the provision~
of Section 33-5-3 Utah Code Annotated 1943.
2. In admitting hearsay evidence of plaintiffs' instructions and statements to their agent, D·owell.
3. In admitting parol evidence to vary the terms
of a \vritten instrument.
4. In admitting evidence to set up an oral contract in violation of the statute of frauds.
5. In admitting testimony of a witness rendered
incom~p.etent by the "dead man's statute", Section 10449-2 (3), Utah Code Annotated 1943.
6. In refusing to grant defendant ~s motion for
non-suit on the ground that the plaintiffs had not sustained their burden to make out a. prima facie case of
mutual mistake.
7. In finding that plain tiffs instructed their agent
to purchase the 25lf2 foot tract as well as the 49lj2 foot
tract.
8. In finding that the plaintiffs' agent entered
into an oral agreement with Cathrine Jensen for the
purchase of the 25lf2 foot tract as well as the 49lj2 foot
tract.
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9. In finding that the plaintiffs believed and understood Exhibits C and D covered the 25lf2 foot tract
as well as the 49¥2 foot tract.
10. In finding that Cathrine Jensen executed Exhibit C and the original of Exhibit D in the belief and
understanding that they covered the 25lf2 foot tract as
"\vell as the 49Jj2 foot tract.
11. In finding that ·Cathrine Jensen discovered her
alleged mistake in September or November, 1947.

12. In finding that plaintiffs bargained for the 25¥2
foot tract as well as the 49Jj2 foot tract and that they
would not have executed Exhibit D had they kno,vn .
that it did not cover the 25lf2 foot tract.
13. In concluding
plain tiffs and Ca thrine
and sale included the
erroneously described
parties to be sold.

as a matter of law that the
Jensen believed the transaction
251f2 feet and that Exhibit D
the property intended by the

14. In concluding that plaintiffs are entitled to a
judgment reforming the contract to include the 25¥2
foot tract ~and that plaintiffs are entitled to costs.
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...\PPELL~\~T'S ARGUMENTS
Each assig-nment of error will not be taken up
separately in this brief. Assignrnents 2, 3, 7 and 9
are discussed under Argun1ent I; Assignment 3 will be
taken up under Argument II; Assignments 1, 4, 12
and 1~ are discussed in Argument III; Assignment 5
under Argument I\'-; and Assignments 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13 and 14 ""'ill be taken up in Argument V.
Ap·pellant's arguments are as follows and will be
considered in the following order :
I. THE COURT ERR.ED IN PERMITTING
HERESAY EVID~ENCE OF THE STATEMENTS OF
PLAINTIFFS TO THEIR AGENT CONCERNING
INSTRUCTIONS TO PURCHASE THE 25% FOOT
TRACT, AND IN FINDING THAT SUCH WERE
THE INSTRUCTIONS AND THAT PLAINTIFFS
INTENDED TO PURCHASE THE SAID 25% FOOT
TRACT.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING ANY
TESTIMONY THE EFFECT OF WHICH WAS TO
VARY THE TERMS-OF THE WRITTEN UNIFORM
REAL ·E·STATE CONTRAC·T.
III. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND
DECREEING THAT THERE WAS- A CONTRACT
FOR THE SALE AND PURCHASE OF THE 25V2
FOOT TRACT OF LAND NOT DESCRIBED IN THE
WRITTEN UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
AS SUCH CONTRACT IS WiiTHIN THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS.
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
THE WITNESS, DOWELL, TO TESTIFY TO CONVERSATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WIT·H CATHSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
RINE JENSEN IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 10449-2 (3), UTAH ·CODE ANNO'TATED 1943.
V. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF
REFORMATION, BECAUSE THERE IS NO CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF A MUTUAL
MISTAKE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE UNIFORM REAL ES·TATE ·CONTRA:CT. .
I.
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING HERESAY EVIDENCE OF THE STATEMENTS OF
PLAINTI·FFS TO THEIR AGENT CONCERNING
INSTRUCTIONS TO PURCHASE THE 25¥2 FOOT
TRACT, AND· IN FINDING THAT SUCH 'WERE
THE INSTRUCTIONS AND THAT PLAINTIFFS
INTENDED TO PURCHASE THE SAID 25¥2 FOOT
TRACT.
In spite of, the fact that there exists as the subject matter of this lawsuit a written Uniform Real
Estate Contract the terms of which are clear and unambiguous, and the parties to which of their own free
will and choice signed, the trial court found that the
parties to the eon tract in tended to agree to something
other than what was expressed in it. As evidence of
what the plaintiffs intended when negotiating and entering into this contract the court permitted both the
p.Iaintiffs and their agent, Dowell, to testify to conversations had regarding the instructions given ·by plaintiffs to Dowell for the purchase of real estate outside
the presence of the defendant or her testator, Cathrine
Jensen.
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. .\t T. 62 in an8\YPr to counsel's question, "What
directions did he give you'?'', D·owell, over the objection of defendant's attorney, \Yas permitted to ans\ver
as follo\vs :
. .\. He said, "I am interested in acquiring
a property next to 1ny auto court." He said,
dit belongs to a woman named Jensen, or some
people named Jensen'' . . . As I recall the conversation the property consisted of a vacant lot
and of a duplex and I said, '' Ho\v much do
you "\Vant to pay for it~" He says, "I understand it can be bought for $8,500.00 but,'' he says,
"I don't think it is worth that much."
It is clear that this statement being made out of court
and not subject to cross examination was hearsay and
inadmissible.
At T. 19 in answer to counsel's question, "What
\Yere your original instructions to Mr. Dowell \Yith
reference to this property~", plaintiff, Jerry Sine,
\Yas permitted over objection of defendant's counsel,
to answer as follows:
A. I told Mr. Dowell that I would like to
purchase the property west of my property, the
corner p~roperty, so that I could square my
property that was in the rear. May I also tell
him what else I told him~
This also was hearsay testimony. 'Statements made by
a witness to other persons are no exception to the
hearsay rule. Evidence of what a witness has said out
of court should not be received to fortify his testimony.
Other instances of admission of this sort of hearsay
evidence are f'Ound at T. 26, T. 27 and T. 28.
~
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It follows that since the above testimony was hearsay and incompetent it should not have been admitted
nor considered by the trial court in determining
whether or not the plaintiffs intended something other
than that expressed by the cle·ar and unambiguous language of the written instrument.
II .
. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING ANY
TESTIMONY THE EFFECT OF WHICH WAS TO
VARY THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN UNIFORM
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT.
The terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract,
entered into between the plaintiffs and Cathrine Jensen were clear and unambiguous, and comprised a complete bilateral executory contract. The execution of
such contract superseded ·all the preceding oral negotiations and stipulations between Mr. Dowell and Cathrine Jensen concerning its terms and the subject property ; and the testimony of Mr. Dowell as to conversations and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous
with the execution of the written contract is inadmissible to contradict, change or add to the terms plainly
incorporated into ·and made a part of the written contract. The Utah statute in reference to this rule bf
evidence is Section 104-48-15, Utah Code Annotated
1943, which reads as follows :
''There can be no evidence of the contents of
a writing, other than the writing itself, except
in the following cases:
(Exceptions not applicable here)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
The annotations to this section include the Utah cases
of Fox Film Corp. vs. Ogden Theatre Co., Inc., 82 Utah
279, 17 Pac. 2d 294, 90 A.L.R. 1299; B. T. Moran, Inc.
vs. First Security C'Orp., 82 Utah 316, 24 Pac. 2d 384;
and Last Chance Ranch Co. vs. Erickson, 82 Utah 475,
25 Par. 2d 952. In the Last Chance Ranch Co. case the
plaintiff sued for specific performance of an oral contract to transfer '66 shares of stock in a loan company
"\\:"'~hich were alleged to haYe been purchased together
with the real property for 'Yhich a deed had been executed and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff offered oral testimony of statements made at
'· the time of delivery of the deed 'vith respect to such
agreement, and it 'vas held that the lower court properly excluded it as varying the terms of the deed. In
the B. T. Moran Inc. case there "'\Yas a written contract
for the purchase of w·allets providing that the seller
would furnish bank-purchaser operators to manage a
savings account campaign. Admission of p.arol ·evidence that the seller's agent represented that such
operators would be experienced in the savings account
business and especially trained in sales psychology was
held to be reversible error. In the Fox Film Corp. case
the defendant had entered into a written contract with
the plaintiff corporation for the use of news reels over
a period of a year. Because they were found to be old
films, when they arrived, the defendant refused them,
and, in that case, defended against ·an action for the
balance due on the contract. It was held that the offered testimony to the effect that plaintiff's agent repSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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resented to defendant that these would be the latest
reels was inadmissible as adding stipulations to the
written contract. The court said that "rhere there is
an obvious ambiguity in the writing extraneous evidence of custom and circumstances might be admitted
to help clarify the ambiguous terms, but ''direct oral
evidence as to representation in the nature of warr~an
ties or as to statements that are in effect stipulations
may not be received . . . The exceptions to the parol
evidence rule pertain usually to informal writings, incomplete memoranda, unilateral documents and other
writings that do not purport to set forth the entire
contract. In cases involving complete contracts signed
by the parties thereto and purporting to contain all
their promises, representations and undertakings, the
rule is ·more -strictly applied.''

III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DECREEING THAT- THERE WAS A CONTRACT FOR
THE SALE AND PURCHASE OF THE 25lf2 FOO·T
TRACT OF LAND NOT DESCRIBED IN THE
WRITTEN UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
AS SUCH ·CONTRACT IS WITHIN ;THE ·STATUTE
OF FRAUDS.
One of the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract involved in this action is that
''there are no representations, covenants, or
agreements between the parties hereto with reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto.''
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The terms of the Earnest nioney Receipt and Agreement include the follo,ving:
'• Contract of sale or instrument of conveyance
to be made on the approved form of the Salt
Lake Real Estate Board"
and
"It is understood and agreed that the terms
"~ritten in this receipt constitute the entire Preliminary Contract between the Buyer and Seller
and that no verbal statements made by a representative of the Agent relative to this transaction shall be construed to be a · part of this
transaction unless incorporated in writing herein. It is further agreed that the execution of
final transfer papers abrogate this Earnest
:L\Ioney Receipt.''
The execution of this latter instrument constituted the
agreement of the parties to a written contract for the
sale and purchase of the property described therein,
and under its own terms there is no other agreement
with reference to said property. Now, when the plaintiffs allege that t·he parties entered into a different contract, it is barred by the statute of frauds because
there· is no written memorandum of it signed by the
parties. The Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement,
although written, by its own terms was abrogated by
the execution of the Uniform Real Estate Contract.
If Cathrine Jensen, the deceased, ever agreed to sell
the 251f2 foot tract to the plaintiffs, there is no written
memorandum of such agreement and under Section 335-3, Utah ·Code Annotated 1943, neither she nor her
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personal representative could be bound by said agreement. The section reads as follows :
Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale, of any
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void
unless the contract, or some note or memorandurn
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by
his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing.
To seek reformation of an executory contract for
additional property is no different from seeking to
bind a person to an alleged oral contract of which
there is no written memorandum. Professor Williston
in his work on Contracts, Revised Edition, says at
Page 4356, Section 1555:
Even where an executory contract relates to
land and is within the Statute of Frauds, many
American authorities allow its reformation
whether a deed has subsequently been executed
in conformity with the written contract or not.
This result deserves support where the instrument contains all the terms required to comply
with the Statute, but one or more of those essential terms are by mistake incorrectly stated.
Some courts, however, have gone further and
reformed an incomplete instrument so as to
conform it to the intention of the parties although the omitted terms were necessary to
comply with the Statute of Frauds. In other
decisions, however, American courts have declined to reform such an executory contract,
especially if it is sought to enlarge the tern1s
of the writing, unless there has. been such ~part
performance or other circumstances as will make
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a failure to reform \York a fraud upon the complainant. The theory of the latter cases seems
sound, and the Restatement of Contracts adopts
it. \V.here ·the only effect of a refusal to reform
a contract is the loss of an executory bargai.n
\Yhich the parties intended to make, it seems
in1possible to give relief on any principle that
would not justify the entire destruction of the
Statute.
It is submitted that under the rule as adopted by the
Restatement of Contracts, the reformation granted in
this case is error because it enlarges the terms of the
contract by extending the description of the property
involved to include an entirely separate tract 251h
feet in width.
What good is the Statute of Frauds if it doesn't
prev-ent the possibility of fraud in the offering of testimony concerning an oral contract for the sale of land~
Here is a contract complete and clear on its face. The
purpose of the statute is to prevent a party or a witness from coming into court and making misrepresentations in trying to set up an oral contract wJlich the
party to be ch·arged denies~ What protection is there
for innocent parties from such fraud if the Statute
of Frauds does not cover this kind_ of case~ And as
Williston says we might as '"'ell get rid of the statute
as to whittle down its effect to a point where it offers
no protection at all.
IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
WITNE·SS, DO·WELL, TO TESTIFY TO CONVERSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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SATIONS AND· NEGOTIATIONS WITH CATHRINE
JENSEN IN VIOL·ATION OF SECTION 104-49-2 (3),
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943.
At common law parties to an action or persons interested in the event thereof were disqualified to testify
on the ground that their interest in the matter tempted
them to perjure ~hemselves. This rule in most jurisdictions both in England and in America has been eliminated by statute· and parties in interest are now
competent witnesses. Practically every jurisdiction,
however, made . an exception, and retained the rule in
the case of a witness who is called to testify ag·ainst
the heirs, devisees or legal representatives of persons
deceased as to conversations, negotiations, or transactions with the deceased. Utah's statute is as follows:
Section 104-49-2, Utah Code Annotated 1943.
The following persons cannot be witnesses :

* * * * *
(3) A party to any civil action, suit or
proceeding, and any person directly interested
in the event thereof, and any person from,
through or under whom such party or interested
person derives his interest or title or any ·part
thereof, when the adverse p·arty in such action,
suit or proceeding claims or opposes, sues or
defends, as guardian of an insane or incompetent
person, or as the executor or administrator, hei1:,
leg a tee or devisee of any deceased person, or as
guardian, assignee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such heir, legatee or devisee, as to any
statement by, or transaction with, such deceased,
insane or incompetent person, or rna tter of fact
whatever, which must have been equally within
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the kno\Yledge of both the \vitness and such insane, incon1petent or deceased person, unless such
·w·itness is called to testify thereto by such adverse party so claiming or opposing, suing or defending, in such action, suit- or proceeding.
There is a split of authority on the question as to
whether or not the statute applies to the testimony of
an agent for the party \vho sues the deceased's representatiYe. The Utah court has never ruled on the
matter. ~Ir. Justice ''rolfe discussed the question in
an article printed in the Utah Bar Bulletin, July-August, 1941, and 13 Rocky Mountain Law Review 282,
June, 1941. In pointing out the type of proceeding in.
which the disqualification exists, he gives a rule that
it seems ought to apply in cases where agents are
called to testify. ·It is as follows:
"A rule of thumb which may not be of uniYersal application but which is at least helpful
is as follo,vs: On one side is a person who is
seeking to protect the integrity of the estate or
to recover assets claimed to belong to it ; on the
other side is a person who seeks to subtract from
the estate or resist recovery of claimed assets.
The statute is for the benefit of the first side
and operates against the opposing party. Therefore when one-- stands on the state, affirms and
acknowledges it for the support of his interest
or claim whether that interest be derived directly
or through heirs or others who took or claimed
through the estate he can take advantage of the
statute. But he whose claim depends upon subtracting from an estate or on establishing the
fact that the property did not belong to or was
not derived from the estate is made incompetent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
by the statute. Where parties all stand on the
estate for their rights but the controversy is
over their respective shares, as in will contests,
the statute does not apply.''
We certainly have a case here where the personal
representative is defending to preserve the estate from
depletion by strangers to the estate. A general rule of
agency is that when an agent acts he acts for his principal. The plaintiffs who are attempting to deplete the
estate were represented by their agent, Dowell, in any
conversations, negotiations and transactions with the
deceased. Applying the rule of agency his transactions
with the deceased were the plaintiffs' transactions with
the deceased, and his testimony concerning those transactions by the same token was as though it was the testimony of the plaintiffs. The case of Banking House
of Wilcoxson and Co. vs. Rood ( 1896), 132 Mo. 256, 33
S. W. 816, supports this · theory. The plaintiff bank
sued the administratrix of the estate of the maker of
a ·note payable to the hank. The cashier and president
of the bank; both of whom were stockholders of the
bank, were allowed to testify to the genuineness of the
signature as well as to the fact that they saw the deceased sign the note. It was held that testimony concerning the signing of the note was concerning a negotiation or transaction, ~and "\Vas improperly admitted.
The court said :
''Signing the note by deceased was part of
the transaction which resulted in the contract in
issue, and the agent of the corporation who conducted the negotiations, 'vhether a stockholder or
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not, could no n1ore testify to that fact than any
other fact connected "\Yith the negotiations . . . .
The court has ever undertaken to conform its
decisions to the spirit, rather than to the strict
letter of this statute. . . . The primary object
and purpose of the law, evidently, vvas to remove
the disabilities by vYhich parties to the record
and parties interested were at common law
-rendered incom·petent to testify. The exception
was intended to :prevent the injustice that would
arise in permitting one party to the contract or
cause of action to testify when the lips of the
other are sealed in death.''
The exception to the Missouri statute in this case "\Va8
as follows:
provided, that in actions where one of the
· original parties to the contract or cause of action
in issue and on trial is dead . . . . the other
_party to such contract or cause of action shall
not be admitted to testify.
and the court said :
A party to the contract has been construed
to mean the person who negotiated the contract
rather than the person in whose name and interest it was made. ·
Another case holding that an agent is included within the rule and which follows the Banking House case
is Taylor vs. George, (1914), 176 Mo. App. -215, 161 S.
W. 1187, in which the plaintiff sued the executor of her
mother's estate on ,a claim that prior to her mother's
death she had rendered care and services under a contract "'Thereby the mother was to pay for said care and
services. The plaintiff's husband, contending to be an
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agent of his wife, was held to be incompetent as a witness inasmuch ~a.s he acted as an agent in negotiating
the contract with his wife's mother. The court in this
case said the following:
. . The present ruling certainly conforms to
the evident purpose of the statute, makes it
uniform in its application, and aids in preventing
inequality and false swearing in that, in all cases
·w·here one of the active parties in making a
contract or conducting a business transaction,
whether as principal or agent, is dead and such
contract or transaction becomes the basis of a
lawsuit, then the other active party is disqualified as a witness with relation thereto. Keeping
this intent and purpose of the proviso to the
, statute in view, much of the difficulty i-n the
construction of the statute vanishes by applying
these principles: That the spirit of the statute
includes in the term ''party to the contract or
cause of action" the agent who negotiated the
contract or conducted the business; that the statute makes no distinction in this respect between
corporations or partnerships and individuals
when acting by agent, and there is no distinction
in principle; that the proviso to the statute
makes the death of the other party to a contract
or cause of action the sole ground and test of
such disability without any reference to the
witness' interest in the controversy or his competency at common law. We therefore hold that
the trial court did -not err in holding that plaintiff's husband is not a competent witness as to
making any contract as agent of his wife with
the deceased and in excluding his evidence as to
such matter.
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It is submitted that the san1e reasons that promp.ted the :3lissouri court to hold the agent incompetent in
these cases and the same reasons that prompted the
legislature to disqualify a party in this state are
present in this case and that Dowell as the agent of
the plaintiffs in negotiating for the purchase of the
real estate from Cathrine Jensen, ought to have been
disqualified from testifying to those transactions after
the lips of Cathrine Jensen had been sealed by death.
The spirit as \Yell as the letter of the law \Yould then
be served.
Not only should Do\vell be disqualified as an agent
of the plaintiffs, but he should also have been held
incompetent as a person interested in the event of the
suit. In referring to the transcr~pt where· defendant's
counsel cross examined Mr. Dowell we find at T. 15:3
the following:
Q. Now you, as I understand, still have a
note of Mr. Sine's which has not been paid, for
the payment of your commission~
A. That's right.
Q. And your instructions were to, you say,
to buy the en tire tract~
A. That's right.
Q. So that if Mr. Sine is not successful in
·this lawsuit you may not be able to collect your
commission~

(An objection was here made \vhich was
overruled.)
A. There was never any question in my
mind about collecting that.
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Q. But you are interested 1n see1ng that
Mr. Sine prevails in this action~
A. Definitely, I feel that I fell down on it,
on my end.
Ap·pellant contends that the interest Mr. Dowell
admits in the action is such a direct interest in the
event thereof as to disqualify him. The best way to
determine if a person should be disqualified because
of interest is to go to the common law and see if,
before the statutes liberalizing the rules of competency,
an agent would have been disqualified because of a
similar interest in a suit. Jones, Commentaries on Evi- ·
dence, 2nd Ed., Vol. 5, Page 4280, also advocates this
guide as follows :
''Sec. 2235-Persons Interested in Suit-In
General-In many jurisdictions the disqualifying
proviso extends to persons generally who are
'in teres ted in the event' of the particular action in which they seek to testify, whether or
not they are parties to the action or to a particular contract in issue. In view of the number
of statutes in which such language is employed,
it becomes necessary to determine the nature of
interest sufficient to bring a proposed witness
within the term. We may say at the outset that
in no event does disqualification for interest
under such provisos go beyond the common law
conception of that term as developed around the
rule prior to comparatively modern statutes that
a party or person '-interested' was incompetent
as a witness in any suit or action. It is conceived that the intent of the provisos in such
statutes could only have been to save the common
law rule in the exceptions stated, and not to
go beyond such rule.''

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
The comn1on la"r rule that disqualified all parties
and all persons interested in the event of the suit was
rather harsh in the case of transactions in which parties usually dealt through agents, brokers and factors,
for there 'Yas no "~a-y of proving the existence of, or
details of, such transactions unless they were permitted
to call their agents, brokers and factors to testify for
them. So out of public necessity and convenience grew
an exception to the interest rule and such individuals
"~ere allowed to testify. But this exception was limited
to cases 'vhere the agent had acted within the ordinary
course of the business of his principal, and where he
had no direct interest in the suit. Greenleaf in his
work on Eviden~e, 14th Ed. Vol. 1, page 503, discusses the question as follows:
"Sec. 417-Limitations of Exception in Favor
of Agents, Etc. - This exception being thus
founded upon considerations of public_ necessity
and convenience, for the sake of trade and the
common usage of business, it is manifest, that it
cannot be .extended to cases where the witness is
called to testify to facts out of the usual and
ordinary course of business, .or to contradict or
deny the effect of those acts which he has done
as agent. He is safely admitted, in all cases, to
prove that he acted according to the directions
of his principal and within the scope of his duty;
·both on the ground of necessity, and because
the principal can never maintain an action
against him for any act done according to his
own directions, whatever may be the result of
the suit in which he is called as a ''Titness. But
if the cause depends on the question, whether
the agent has been guilty of some tortious act,
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or some negligence in the course of executing
the orders of his p~rincipal, and in respect of
which he would be liable over to the principal, if
the latter should fail in the action pending
against him, the agent, as we have seen, is not
a competent witness for his principal, without
a release. ''
and here Mr. Greenleaf cites the case of Fuller vs.
Wheelock, 10 Pick. 135, an old Massachusetts case decided in the days before the relaxation of the competency rules. The p~laintiff brought an action on a
promissory note, and the defendant pleaded payment
to the plaintiff's agent. The plaintiff was allowed to
put on his agent who testified that even though he made
out a receipt to the defendant, he didn't receive the
payment. The court held that admission of this testimony was error because of the incompetency of the
witness. A part of the decision of the court is as follows:
''The question then is, was this witness incompetent by reason of interest, and the court
are of opinion that he was. He was the ackno,:rledged agent of the plaintiff to receive the money;
his receipt was prima facie evidence that he had
received it, and the plaintiff had given him no
release. If the plaintiff failed in this suit, he
would have an immediate action against the
witness for money had and received; an action
which a recovery in this suit. would bar. If the
plaintiff should prevail in thi~ suit, the defendant would have no action over against the witness, to recover back the money, without being
obliged to p~rove not only that he had paid the
money according to the terms of the receipt, but
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also that the ".,.itness had been g'uilty of son1e
brearh of trust, to,Yards the party of 'vhom the
money " . . as rereived, so as to bring the case
'Yithin the principle of Fow'ler v. Shearer, 7
~lass. 23. Otherwise, the 'vitness being duly
authorized to receive the money, would be responsible to his prinripal only, and not to the
defendant. ,,. . e think, therefore, that his direct
interest on one side, was not balanced by an
equal interest on other side, and that he was
not· a competent witness.
''X or does the " . . itness come within the exception in regard to agents. This exception is
founded upon considerations of necessity and
great public convenience, for the sake of trade,
and the common usage of business. These cousiderations, cannot apply where a witness is
called to testify to facts out of the usual and
common course ~f business, and to contradict
and deny the effect of those acts which he appears
to have done as such agent."
At 70 Corpus Juris 266 the rule, as supported by
possibly the \Yeight of authority, that allows an agent
to testify· is stated and then qualified to include Greenleaf's limitation as follows:
''Sec. 333-Agent of Party-One who acted
as an agent for another in a transaction with a
person since deceased is, as a general rule, competent to testify as to transactions or communi-cations with decedent. An agent, being neither a
party to, nor directly interested in, the result
of an action by or against his principal or a
representative of his deceased principal, is competent as a witness therein. However, where the
agency is coupled with an interest in the event
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of· the action, the agent will be disqualified as a
witness.''
Corpus Juris cites in support of this last sentence the
above quotation from Greenleaf, and the case of Bruner
vs. Battell's Executors, 83 Ill. 317. The Illinois case
involved the question of the last installment payment
on a real estate contract, and was being prosecuted by
the purchaser's personal representative. Following the
Fuller vs. Wheelock, supra, case the court held that
the seller's agent should not have been allowed to testify as t~ non-payment. The court said that prior to the
Statute of 1867 which removed the disqualification of
parties and those interested in the event of the suit,
there would have been no question as to the incompetency of the agent's testimony and further that ''the
act of 1867 -would have removed the disability of the
agent by reason of his interest,. had he testified while
Bruner was living; but when he testified Bruner 'vas
dead, the suit was being prosecuted by his widow and
heirs, and the matter of his evidence comes within
none of the exceptions in that statute, which allows au
interested party to testify, notwithstanding the suit is
being _prosecuted by the representatives of a deceased
person, on the theory that the mouth of the deceased
had been closed by death.''
Dowell admitted as shown above- that he felt that
he had let Mr. Sine down in negligently transacting the
bu~iness it is alleged he had been employed to perform.
Why shouldn't Mr. Sine, if he instructed Dowell to
purchase both tracts, seek retribution from Dowell for
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his neglig-ence·? Of course, he ean 't sue Dowell for
specific performance, but he could sue for damages for
the loss of the bargain it is alleged he thought he was
getting. Dowell kne\Y there was the possibility of such
a suit and therefore it is possible he was tempted to
testify as he did, in trying to set up this mutual mistake~ for as the court in the Fuller vs. Wheelock case,
supra, said 'if the plaintiff failed in this suit, he would
have an immediate action against the witness . . . an
action \Yhich a recovery in this suit would bar.'' Of
course, the appearance of the plaintiffs and the witness Dowell in court was that they were very friendly.
and that the plaintiffs had no ill teeling toward Dowell
for his negligence i~ the closing of the transaction.
Nevertheless it is submittede that if the plaintiffs should
eventually lose this ease on appeal they might well
proceed against Mr. Dowell, and there is authority that
they would have a good cause of action. The Restatement of Agency, Section 379 provides as follows :
4

Unless otherwise agreed a paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal to act with standard care and with the skill which is standard
in the locality for the kind of work which he
is employed to perform and, in addition, to exercise any special skill that he has.
The fact that the plaintiffs were negligent themselve~
in not carefully reading the contr·act, as prepared by
Mr. Dowell, if such fact is true, would be no defense
for Mr. Dowell in the event of suit against him by
plaintiffs for his negligence in representing them. An
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example of this is the case of Shapiro vs. Amalgamated
Trust and Savings Bank, 283 Ill. App. 243. In this
case the plaintiff had instructed her bank to obtain a
fire insurance policy on some property of hers. The
bank purch,ased a policy which carried a condition as
follows: "Void if the interest of the insured be other
than unconditional and sole ownership.'' The officers
of the bank who handled the transaction for her knew
that her ownership was not sole and unconditional.
When plaintiff's p·remises were destroyed by fire and
the insurance company refused to reimburse for the
fire damage because of the condition, plaintiff brought
~an action for neglig~nce against the bank and its defense was that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
for not reading the policy ~erself. The Court held for
the plaintiff, and in its decision said the following:
''In the instant case the defendant was the
agent of the plaintiffs in procuring the insurance
policy and it cannot avoid liability because of
an alleged failure on the part of the plaintiff
to ascertain whether the agent has faithfully
performed the duty for which it was employed."
·rn recapitulation of the points of this argument
the court should note, first, that the agent, Dowell, was
negligent in not purchasing for his clients the 25¥2
foot tract, if his instructions were in fact to so purchase it; second, that the plaintiffs' failure to read the
contract carefully would be no bar to an action by said
plaintiffs against Dowell for his negligence; third, that
if plaintiffs succeed in this lawsuit they will, of course
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,.

be barred against suing Do,Yell, or conversely, if they
do not succeed, they Inight well bring an action ~against
Dow·ell; fourth, that such possibility of suit gives
Do,vell a direct interest in the outcome of the present
action, and such interest, under our statute, is sufficient to disqualify him as a witness against the ·defendant.

v.
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF
REFOR)IA.TION, BECAUSE THERE IS NO CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF A MUTUAL
MISTAKE IN THE EXE·CUTION OF THE UNIFOR}I REAL ESTATE CO·NTRA·CT.
To secure reformation of a written contract which
is presumed to be the real contract and to contain all
the terms agreed upon, the party seeking relief and
demanding reformation of the contract must establish
the mutual mistake by evidence that is clear, satisfactory and convincing. This rule was early est~ab
lished in Utah as indicated in the following cases:
Cram vs. Reynolds, (1919) 55 Utah 384, 186 Pac. 100;
Wherritt vs. Dennis, 48 Utah 309, 159 Pac. 534; Weight
vs. Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 147 Pac. 899; Deseret National
Bank vs. Dinwoodey et al., 17 Utah 43, 53 Pac. 215;
Ewing vs. Keith, 16 Utah 312, 53 Pac. 4; Chambers
vs. Emery, 13 Utah 374. Whether it is the alleged mistake made by the plaintiff who is attempting to show
a different contract from that which is written, or
whether it is the alleged mistake of the defendant who
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is insisting that he made no mistake, the evidence to
est~ablish the mistake of either must be clear, sati~
factory- and convincing.
In order to determine whether or not there is any
clear and convincing evidence that Cathrine Jensen
ever intended to sell the 25¥2 foot tract together with
the 49¥2 foot tract to the plaintiffs, or that she did in
fact agree to sell the 25y2 foot tract, as alleged by
plaintiffs, we rriust make a careful e~amination of the
evidence. In that connection there follows all of the
evidence that has any bearing on the alleged fact that
she had such intention or so agreed; and it must be
noted that it is all Mr. Dowell's testimony, for both
the plaintiffs, Jerry and Dor~a Sine, testified that they
had no contact with Cathrine Jensen, personally, before, or at the time of, the execution of the contract.
T. 46, and T. 58.
The following testimony of Mr. Dowell was admitted over -the objection of defendant's counsel (T.
70):
Q. Did you talk to Mrs. Jensen concerning
this property~
A. Yes.
Q. How many times~
MR. MACFARLANE: Now my objection goes
to this whole line of testimony, if Your Honor
please.
THE CouRT: Yes, that is the understanding.
A. Well, I called on Mrs. Jensen twice at
her home on Eighth South and at least three
tiines at her home on Third South.
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Q. How many of those conversations were
prior to the execution of these contracts, prior
to the execution of Exhibit D, the Uniform Real
Estate contract 1
A. ''Tell, it would be two on Eighth South
prior to the time I drew· up this contract because
,,,.e hadn't reached a meeting of the minds on
the purchase price and terms.
Q. No\Y on your first approach to Mrs.
Jensen, state where and \Yhen that took place.
A. "Vv~ell, that was in her home on Eighth
South. As a matter of fact, it was termed her·
husband's home. It belonged to Mr. Jensen, as
I understand it. At any rate she was there
"~hen I rang the bell or knocked.
MR. MACFARLANE: Now I want the further
objection, if Y-our Honor please and the record
to show that the negotiations of the parties
later resulted in a written agreement and that
all of the conversations and negotiations were
merged in a written agreement and this conversation is incompetent, ·- irrevelant and immaterial.
THE CouRT: The objection is overruled.
Q. Will you proceed 1
A. Mrs. Jensen, I learned after, asked me
to come 1n. The door, the screen door was
locked. Her daughter from Colorado at that
time was there and opened the door. I said to
Mrs. Jensen, ''My name is Dowell. I am a real
estate agent. I understand you own some property on West North Temple adjoining the
Bishop's Auto Court~" She said, "That is
right." I said, "Is it for sale~" She said, "Yes,
I'll sell it." I said, "What would you ask for
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it1 What would you take, including the commission 1" She said, "I want $8,500.00." I said, "I
can't get $8,500.00. I can get you $8,000.00. I
am authorized to buy it for $8,000.00.'' She
said, "who wants to buy it 1" At first I was
reluctant to say it. I was thinking in my own
mind if I went down there( Objection-Sustained.)
· A. She asked who wanted to buy it. I said,
"The man who owns the auto court next to it,
Mr. Sine.'' She said, ''He should pay more for
it." I said, "$8,000.00 is all he wants to pay
for it and in my opinion that is a lot of money
for it.'' She talked about a lot of things. Her
daughter came in and we talked about everything
but real estate. We agreed( Objection-Overruled.)
A. The conversation involved the $8,500.00.
If I could get Mr. Sine to pay $8,500.00 with
$1,500.00 down and $75.00 a month she vvould
accept it. I went back to Mr. Sine and asked,
told him what I had found out.

* * * * *
(T. 73)
Q. Then you went back to Mrs.·

Jensen~

A. I didn't go back to Mrs. Jensen that
day. I went back the following day.

Q.

Where did you see her then 1

A.

At the place I met her previously.

Q. Who was present at that time1
A. Mrs. Jensen, as I recall, was there.
Her daughter was just driving away. In fact,
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her daughter "~as preparing to go back to Colorado, as I recall.
Q. Will you state "\Yhat the conversation
"\Yas on that occasion~
A. I said, ''Sine still wants to buy it for
$1,000.00 and he will pay $75.00 a month for
t"\YO years.'' She said, ''I'm not going to pay
a commission out of $1,000.00. It doesn't give
me any money.'' I said, ''As a matter of fact,
I am g·oing to lend Sine the commission. You
agreed to take $8,000.00 net. Sine is paying the
commission.'' And then that is when I had this
agreement and she signed it.
Q. Now h-ad Sine already signed this Exhibit?
A. Yes. When Sine firstTHE CouRT: That is the earnest money receipt you are talking about now~
A. Uh huh.
Q. Exhibit c~
A. You see I didn't have an earnest money
receipt when Sine first talked to me about it.
(Objection-Overruled.)

Q.

Well, have you -related all of those con-

versations~

A. You mean up to this time the earnest
money receipt was signed~
Q. Yes.
A. Generally everything, as I recall, that
has been said.
Q. Was anything said other than what you
have testified to concerning the identity of the
property or description of it~
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A. There was nothing said other than talking about the property.
(Objection interposed here. Overruled.)
A. That was all that was said. I said, ''The
property that adjoins the Bishop's Auto Court."
Q. Was there any conversation regarding
dimensions'
A. Yes.
MR. MACFARLANE: I object to that as leading
and suggestive.
THE CouRT: The objection is overruled.
A. There was talk about the dimensions
when we were talking about this price. 1\tfy
opinion was it was a lot of money for a house
forty years old. I said, ''If you figure this outthe house isn't worth very much money-this
man is paying $8,000.00 for aQ. Give your conversation.
A. She said, ''I get eighty or ninety dollarH
a month income from that and I could get a lot
more if rent controls were taken off." I said,
''The fact remains you are getting more than
$100.00 a foot for it. This· buyer is going to
tear the house down anyway.'' She said, ''That
has nothing to do with me. He is crazy if he
is going to tear it down.'' I knew the piece down
the streetMR. MACFARLANE: I object to what he kne,v,
Your Honor~
Q. State what you told her.
A. I told her a piece down th~ street sold
for $85 a foot.
Q. Do you know whether the matters you
have just related were in the first or second conversation~
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A. Well, they· were both in the second conversation. I am inclined to think they were in
the second conversation. The first time it was
even more conversation and I didn't know what
Sine would say so I couldn't sign up anything
definitely, "'"hether he wanted to pay $8,500.00
or not, so I couldn't say anything definitely.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF DOWELL (T. 148)
BY ~lR. BIRD:

Q. N O\Y, Mr. Dowell, you stated last evening out of Court to me that there was some
additional conversation that you had with Mrs.
Jensen prior to the execution of the earnest
money receipt in this case which you didn't
mention and had not volunteered, is that correct 1
A. That's right.
Q. Will you state what that was~
* * * * *
MR. MACFARLANE: Now may I have the same
objection that I have been· interposing-that this
is an incompetent witness and ·this is hearsay:
THE CouRT: Yes you may, and the objection
will be overruled.
A. In the conversation, trying to . prevail
upon Mrs. Jensen, trying to get her to accept
$8,000.00 for the property, I said, ''Of course
this property is worth- more to· my client than
anyone else. That is the main reason he is paying $8,000.00. The main reason is to straighten
this out.'' I said, "However, he has in mind
building a cafe there. People staying in this
court have objected to having to go so far. They
would stay one night and the next day they
would move on account of having to go so far
to get satisfactory food. Sine says I believe I
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could vut up a restaurant there and not only
make it pay meTHE CouRT: This is what Mr. Sine said to
you~

Q.

This is in your conversation with Mrs.

Jensen~

THE CouRT: Oh, you told Mrs. Jensen that~
A. Yes.
THE CouRT: All right.
A. ''Sine had told me he aimed to put up
a restaurant for the reason it would not only be
p~rofitable to him but it would add to the value
of his auto court, the operation of it. It would
be a more complete operation.'' And Mrs. J ensen said, ''Well, I have had in mind doing something of that nature myself, if my health permitted or if I had somebody to entrust it to
whom I could rely upon. I still might do that.''
She reluctantlyMR. MACFARLANE: I move that "reluctantly"
be stricken.
THE CouRT: Well, that part, that word will
go out. Just don ~t use the word ''reluctantly.''
Q. Describe what she said and did and if
you can make plain her attitude. Otherwise you
must not _say what was in her mind. You say
what she said and did.
A. She said, ''I would hold on to the property. The children don't want me to sell it. But
I am glad to be free of it for the reason that
I just can't take care of it.'' She had a granddaughter living in the propertyMR. MAcFARLA:NE: Now did she say that~
A. Yes. She told me her granddaughter
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"\Yas there .. I could have found her w'ithout going
to all of the trouble to locate her. But of course
at the time I didn't kno'v that her granddaughter
lived there.
Q.

Have you completed the

conversation~

A. Yes.
Except for some references to Mrs. Jensen in
connection 'vith obtaining the abstract from her and
haYing her sign an affidavit ~and the Uniform Real
Estate Contract itself, the above is the complete testimony of Mr. Dowell "\vith respect to any conversations
he had "\Yith Cathrine Jensen from which there is any
indication of what was on her mind, when she entered
into this contract, concerning the amount of ground
she intended to sell. And among_ all these statements
only three provide ~any inference at all that Catherine
Jensen might have thought that the contract was forthe 25¥2 foot tract as- well as for the 491f2 foot tract.
Twice Dowell referred to the property Sine wanted to
purchase as the property adjoining the Bishop's Auto
Court, T. 72 and T. 75, and once at T. 149 and T. 150
the conversation concerned Sine's desire to put up a
restaurant or eafe there. Regarding this restaurant
or cafe, there is nothing to show that Cathrine Jensen
might not have thought that Sine's desire was to put
up the cafe or restaurant on the 49lf2 foot piece, on
the corner, because Dowell had previously told her
that if Sine purchased the property he would tear
down the duplex on it (T. 76). Therefore, it is not
unreasonable to believe that Cathrine Jensen didn't
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realize that Dowell was bargaining for the 25¥2 foot
piece as well.
As against this incompetent evidence concerning
these conversations there is the testimony of all of the
Defendant's witnesses, including herself, that Cathrine
Jensen, at some time either just before or soon after
she executed the Uniform Real Estate Contract, had
told them she had plans for the use of the 25¥2 foot
piece of ground. The defendant, Mrs. Harper, and a
daughter of Mrs. Jensen, testified at T. 110 and 111
as follows:
Q. Now were there any other conversations
at which you were present in which the twentyfive-and-a-half-foot strip was discussed?
A. Well, .a long time before that.
Q. When would a long time before be~
A. That was in the fall of 1947.
Q. And who was p·resent at this conversation?
A. Well, niy father and Mrs. Freeman and
sheMR. BIRD: Could we have the date of that
and the place?
A. Well, it was about September of 1947.
Q.

* * * * *
Now will you relate that conversation,

please~

(Objection-Overruled.)
A. At that time she wanted my father to
build him a little lunchstand, hamburger place,
-you know. Something along that order, thought
it would give him a small income for his livelihood.
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The following testimony at ~. 126, 127 was given
by Mrs. Freeman, another daug·hter of Cathrine Jensen:
Q. Now, 1\lrs. Freeman, did you in the year
1947 discuss \Yith your mother, or was the matter
discussed in your presence about this twentyfive-and-a-half-foot strip after the sale of the
forty-nine-and-a-half-foot strip to Mr. Sine~
A. Yes sir.
Q. And when was that, please~

A. That was right, I talked "ri th her right
after she had sold the place.

* * * * *
A. Mother said I could go ahead and use
the twenty- five- and- a- half- foot piece and my
father could build us a little hamburger place
and little lunchstand and she thought he was a
good cook and he could cook and I could help
him. She said that would be adequate, it would
be plenty large for a little five-cent place and
since there was tourist cabins around there and
she thought that would be a nice place and I
mentioned that to Mrs. Sine.''
And then at T. 128 she further testified to the same
conversation in September, 1947, as Mrs. Harper testified to.
Mr. Biddinger, the father of Mrs. Harper and ~rs.
Freeman, from whom Mrs. Jensen had been divorced
in 1937, testified at T. 134 to the conversation in September, 1947 referred to _above, and further at T. 135
that he had a conversation with Cathrine Jensen in
June, 1948, at which time she told him she wanted hhu
to take this 25lf2 foot piece of property and build a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

50

little house on it, beoause he was then living in a base.
ment apartment and was getting rheumatism.
Mr. J. C. Jensen, the deceased's surviving husband,
tes~tified at T. 140 to the same general line of conversations, although he did not place any one of them at
any particular time.
Another daughter of Cathrine Jensen, named Verda Wheeler, testified at T. 165, 166 that the day her
mother signed the Earnest Money Receipt ~nd Agreement, the day of Dowell's second visit, she and her
mother went to the premises at 656-658 West North
Temple, and had the following conversation:
A. Well mother, she said, ''They are not
buying all of this. '' She said, '' They are buying
this that the house is on'' and showed me what
it was and I asked her why she wasn't selling
the other twenty-five feet and she said, "I didn't
buy that with the place and I am not selling it
with the place." She said -she wanted to put a
hamburger stand some place on it and she said,
''I am not selling the place.''
Mrs. Wheeler further testified at T. 166 as follows:
Q~

Now during the conversation that you
heard on the first occasion did you ever hear
Mr. Dowell mention seventy-five-foot frontage~
A. No sir, I don't remember hearing any
footage mentioned at all. As I remember it, it
was numbers ~656 and 658.
Q. And did you during that conversation
hear a statement in substance and effect made
by Mr. Dowell that at $8,000.00 she would be
getting more than $100.00 a foot~
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.A..

X o sir, I don't remember $8,000.00 be-

ing mentioned.
Q. Did you on that occasion, the first occasion, ever hear the name of Mr. Do,vell 's client
or the prospective purchaser mentioned~
A. No sir. Not until mother and I went
up to the house. The day we went up to the
house she told me \Yho was buying it.
Q.

Well, that was the second

A.

The second time, yes sir.

time~

The existence of the written Uniform Real Estate
Contract requires that plaintiffs' evidence of mistake be
clear and convincing. In the light of all of the above
evidence, Dowell's testimony is certainly not clear and
convincing. He stands alone as the only person who
has given any evidence of Cathrine Jensen's alleged
mistake. Even the court at T. 99, after hearing Dowell's
testimony concerning his two visits to Cathrine Jensen,
said there was no proof as to when she learned about
the ·fact that the con tract did not include the 25¥2
foot piece. It is admitted that she knew about it on
the 24th day o£ November, 1947 when she paid the
taxes on it. There being no proof according to the
court as to when she learned of it prior to that timf~,
there is no ~proof that she didn't know all the time just
exactly what the description in the contract covered.
Of course, as shown above, plaintiffs have attempted
to prove by Dowell's testimony of conversations with
Cathrine Jensen that she intended and agreed to sell
the 25¥2 foot piece, but not one word of it refers to
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any statement by her that she intended to sell the 251;2
foot tract.
Following a long line of Utah cases the court in
the case of Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 Pac.
206, upheld the lower court's refusal to reform a cont:vact for the sale of land, the default on which was
the basis for an action in unlawful detainer. The defendants claimed that the contract failed to express
the true intent of the parties in that it incorrectly provided that the mortgage was renewable for an additional term of three years, instead of for additional
terms of three years, as intended by the parties and
that the scrivenor had made the mistake. Both defendants testified that in the ,conversations had prior to
the making of the contract it was stated that the plaintiff would gr~ant them the privilege of renewing this
mortgage for additional terms. The plaintiff and her
daughter testified just as positively that it was for one
additional term. The attorney who drafted the paper
testified that it was the understanding between the parties that it should be for additional terms and that the
language in the instrument was probably the result of
a typographical error of his stenographer. The court
held that such was not clear and convincing evidence
of the mistake and denied reformation.
Cases from a few other jurisdictions might serve
to show what is intended by the requirement that the
mutual mistake be proven by cle3:r and convincing evidence. In the case of Biskupski vs. Jaroszewski (1947)
398 Ill. 287, 7-6 N. E. 2d 55, the appellate court re-
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versed a decree of reformation of a contract for the
purehase of property described as a corner store kno"\\rn
as 8450 Commercial Avenue, which the plaintiff claimed
"~~as intended to include another store next to it known
as 8448, both of which stores were in the same building. The holding of the court was in spite of the following evidence in favor of the plaintiff: Plaintiff tes-tified that the preliminary negotiations concerned the
whole "building". The plain tiff's son testified that
the 'vord "building" \vas used. The plaintiff's son-inla'Y -testified to the same effect concerning the negotiations and further that when the defendant took them
to look at the premises they went back and looked at
the ''building" from the rear. The real estate agent
\Yho dre\Y the contract testified that he knew of both
numbers, and when he asked whether to use both numbers in the contract, he was told by the defendants
that 8450 covered the whole building. The court said
that this evidence was too loose and there were too
many discrepancies to overcome the strong presumption arising out of the written contract.
In the case of 'Teutsch vs. Hvistendahl (1947), _
S. D. _ , 29 N. W. 2d 389, the seller owned lots 7 and
8. The house was mostly on lot 7, but overlapped 6.7
feet onto lot 8. The written contract for the sale of
the house, prepared by the seller, provided for the
sale of Lot 7 only. The purchaser upon discovery of
his error sued for reformation of the contract to include lot 8. On the ground that there had never been
any understanding bet,veen the parties prior to the
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written contract which differed from the intention
manifested in said contract, the court held that the
trial court's refusal to reform the contract was correct.
If there ever existed a set of facts that justified a
court of equity to reform a deed they were in the Missouri case of Hood vs. Owens (1927), 293 S. W. 774. In
that case the parents of the ·plaintiffs had owned a four
acre tract of land upon which stood their home, and two
town platted lots adjoining the four acre tract across
which lots was a road giving access to the highway
which adjoined the town platted lots on the opposite
side from the four acre tract. The parents had obtained all three parcels in the same deed. This case
concerns a deed· to the two plaintiffs from their p~r
ents, reserving a life estate, which deed described only
the two town platted lots. The complaining daughter
con tended that the parents had in tended to include all
three parcels. At the time of executing the deed the
parents had also executed a will disposing all· of their
other property to several other children. It carried
this provision: ''My daughters Nellie Gee and Lena
Gericke (Plaintiffs ·herein) having already been ·provided for, I give nothing to them out of my personal
.property.'' The will disposed of no real property, but
purported to dispose of all the ,property left. The evidence was to the effect that the deed and will were
both made at the hank by Judge Hopper. The banker
who was a witness to the will testified iri part as follows:
''Judge Hopper had the book and did most
- of the explaining, and my recollection is that he
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read it over, the will, and the question was asked
there ""hy the two girls got nothing, and it was
explained there that the old folks had deeded
this fiye acres to them, to these two girls.''
A. They brought the "\vill there. The reason
that he gave· them nothing, they had been paid
out. They were provided for in the deed.
Q. To 'vhat~
..~..-\.. To that five acres "\vhere they lived, that
he had "\vhen they lived there, to the five acres.

* * * * *
Q. Do you know what land was described
In the deed~
A. No sir, only it "\Vas understood to be
that five acres.
Q. Who understood that~
A. Judge Hopper and the two ·old folks."
A Mrs. Della Call testified :
''I knew where the Gericke home was in
Miller. They owned four or five acres there. I
talked to her about this home there at Miller.
She said it was coming to Lena Hood and Nellie
Gee at her death.
Lena Hood testified:
''Mama had told me, and Papa did too, why
he hadn't given us anything in his "\vill. Because
we were to take care of mother as long as she
lived and of him as long as he lived also, and it
was to fall to us at her death, the property.''

* * * * *
Q. Did your mother tell you that this deed
had been made~
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THE CouRT: What did she say about it~
A. She told me the next day after Mr.
Hopper was out there how they had made the
will, and she had made the deed out and how
she had made it to us girls. We were to take
care of her as long as she lived.
THE CouRT: Had made a deed to what~
A. To that property to us girls.
Q. To what property~
A. To the four acres that .we were living
on. That was all. she h·ad.
Q. What did she say about what property
it was that she had made the deed to~
A. It was .the four acres, the place we were
living on. They were to have the right to it as
long as they lived. . . . ''
-·
An excer~p:t from the decision of the court is as
follows:
'' The evidence tends to show that the two
platted town lots, conveyed to L·ena Hood and
Nellie Gee by the Warranty Deed which they
seek to have reformed, have a width of only
fifteen feet and the area of the two lots is so
small that no substantial buildings or improvements can be erected thereon, and that the two
platted lots are practically valueless, unless they
be used as a part of the four-acre tract of land
in controversy, immediately adjoining said ·lots
on the south. The two platted lots lie between
the four-acre tract and a public road or street
on the north of said lots. Access to the public
street from the four-acre tract can be had only
over and across the two platted lots. The dwelling house and improvements are located entirely
upon the four-acre tract in controversy.
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'·But \Yhether the makers of the deed erred
in their judgment as to the value of the two
platted lots \Yhich \Yere actually conveyed by the
deed, or \Yhether they intended to convey by the
deed the four-acre tract in question, as well as
the t"~o pia tted lots \vhich \Yere actually conveyed
by the deed, \Ve find no clear and convincing
proof in this record of the manifest intention of
the makers of the deed to have included in the
deed the four-acre tract of land, which respondents, long after the· deaths of the scrivener and
makers of the deed, now seek to have inserted
therein.''
"''Thile it may be true that an inference might
be drawn from the evidence and surrounding
circumstances herein, which, in the ordinary trial
of facts, might justify a finding that the grantors
intended to include in the deed the four-acre
tract omitted therefrom, yet such inference cannot be indulged where reformation of an executed
\Yritten instrument is sought in equity, inasmuch
as clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of mutual mistake is always required in actions for
reformation of such an instrument.
"It follows that the circuit court erred in
decreeing reformation of the deed from Jennie
l\1. and Henry J. Gericke to respondents, Lena
Hood and Nellie Gee, and that the judgment of
partition, based upon such reformation, is likewise erroneous. ' '
It might be helpful to . the court to consider two
or three cases in which a reformation of the written
instrument has been granted in order to determine
whether or not there is the necessary clear and convincing evidence in the case at bar. A recent case in
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California, Good vs. Lindstrom (1947), 80 Cal. App.
2d 476, 181 Pac. 2d 933, granted reformation of a deed
which, included 6¥2 acres instead of 1¥2 acres originally
agreed upon as claimed by the Seller. Plaintiff put in
evidence a document purporting to be an offer to purchase signed by the defendant, which described the
property as 1¥2 acres. The court said the evidence
was convincing. This case is easily distinguishable
from the case at bar for there is no writing anywhere
in the case at bar which describes the property as a
75 foot tract.
In Whitt ys. Proctor (1947), 305 Ky. 454, 204 S.
W. 2d 582, there was involved a deed describing only
three out of. five contiguous lots. The grantees under
the deed took possession of all five lots believing them
all to have been conveyed. The grantors even watched
the grantees tear down a barn and remove peach trees
on the two lots that were not included in the deed. All
five lots were later sold by the original grantees men.ti'Oned above to subsequent purchasers from them, who
likewise took possession and used all five lots for 20
years. The latter discovered the mistake in the original
purchaser's deed and sued in equity for its reformation to include the other two lots. The court held the
evidence to be sufficiently clear and convincing to grant
reform'ation, especially because the defendant had slept
on his rights · and led the purchasers to believe that he
had intended to sell all five lots.
The plaintiff in Capone vs. Roberts, (1947) 73 N.
Y. Supp. 2d 712, owned three parcels of land by virtue
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of one deed. T'vo parcels had houses on them. The
third did not. The deed in questi'on described all three
parcels also. Plaintiff, the seller, brings this action in
equity for reformation of the deed so as to include
only one parcel in the deed, claiming that the preliminary negotiations for sale which referred only to 1222
Dabney . .\.venue ""'"ere intended to cover only the one
parcel. There "\Yas evidence produced at the trial that
the seller who couldn't read or speak English well took
his old deed to his attorney to have the new deed drawn
up, and the attorney knowing no better, copied the
same description. Although the defendant testified that
he thought he was to get all three parcels, his lawyer
frankly admitted that he was surprised to -learn that
the description in the deed included more than one
house. There was further evidence that the parcels
were fenced separately, and assessed for taxes separately. A written notice of- change of o'vnership was
prepared at the time of closing and sent to the- tenants of 1222 Dabney Avenue, but none was sent to
the tenants of the other house, which the court said
\vas significant, because if the buyer had thought he
purchased both houses he would have sent notices to all
tenants. The court granted reformation in this case on
the ground of clear and convincing evidence of a mistake. This case is also distinguishable from the case
at bar in that the reformation is to decrease the terms
of the instrument rather than to increase them. If the
facts of the case at bar were reversed so that the contract described a 75 foot tract, and the defendant was
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suing for reformation to have it decreased to 49¥2 feet
she would· be in the position of the plaintiff in the
Cap~one vs. Rloberts case. There is a physical line of
demarcation between the 25lj2 and 49¥2 foot tracts in
that the hedge in front of the duplex does not extend
over in front of the 25¥2 foot tract ('T. 4), furthermore
the properties are assessed separately for taxes, and
as a matter of fact the taxes as sh'own above were paid
by Cathrine Jensen on the 25¥2 foot tract for the year
of 1947 (Defendants Exhibit 2).
There is uncontradicted. evidence in the record (T.
117) and also among the exhibits, to the effect that
Cathrine Jensen purchased the two tracts of land
separately, the 49% foot tract in 1930, and the 25~2
foot tract in 1939. She obtained two separate abstracts,
both of which are exhibits in this case (see defendant's
exhibits 1 and 3). Surely she wouldn't forget that she
possessed separate abstracts at the time Mr. Dowell
came to her for the abstr:act on the property. If she
had thought that the sale was to include both pieces
of property, she would have given him both abstracts.
This action on her part speaks for itself, that her intention was that she was selling only the 491j2 foot
tract, and consequently she handed to Mr. Dowell the
abstr:a'ct to that piece only. Plaintiffs alleged that lf
this were true, then Cathrine Jensen intended to defraud them, but, of course, the lower court found no
evidence of fraud, and therefore such a consideration
is unfounded and is beyond the issue'S of this appeal.
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CONCLUSION
Summarizing this argun1ent, the "~ritten contract
described the 49% foot tract only, and in· every particular the instrument 'Yas clear and complete on its
face. Such an instrument creates a strong presumption that it represents the real intent and agreement
of the parties, and such presumption can be overcome
only by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. The
only evidence of a mistake on the part of Cathrine
Jensen is the testimony of ~Ir. Dowell, whose competency is very much in doubt be,cause of his being an
agent of one of the parties, and also because of his
direct interest in the outcome of the case. Can such
evidence be considered clear, cogent and convincing,
especially in the face of the evidence, given by the witnesses for defendant, to the effect that the deceased
had stated on several occasions that she had plans for
the use of the 25% foot tract, and in face of tthe fact
that the properties had been acquired· separately and
were covered by separate abstracts, only one of which
Cathrine Jensen gave to Mr. Dowell~ Furthermore it
was Cathrine Jensen who paid the taxes on the 251f2
foot tract in November of 1947, not Mr~ Sine.
Appellant contends that if the court sustains the
lower court in the reformation of this contract a great
deal of the sanctity of written instruments es:pe-cially
concerning the sale of land will have been lost, and
persons dealing in land contracts will never have the
security and protection intended under the statute of
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frauds. Appellant earnestly requests that your honorable court review this record and reverse the lower
court and direct that judgment be entered in favor of ·
the defendant denying reformation, and for whatever other relief to the court seems proper.

GRANT MACFARLANE
ROBERT S. RICHARDS
Attorneys for Appellant.
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